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somewhat broader perspective. Historians of Chinese mathematics should also 
find it a very interesting popularizing classic from the perspective of the long 
tradition of Chinese mathematics reaching up to the complications and transitions 
of 20th-century China. Although mostly set up in a purely mathematical form, 
Popularizing establishes a very useful point of reference for the intellectual and 
social foundations of the modern period and so stands in close relation to the vast 
and stimulating history and sociology of contemporary Chinese mathematics. 
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The editors of this excellent collection, Philip Kitcher and William Aspray, 
have made things easy for the reviewer. The fourteen articles here are classified 
into four groups: Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics; Reinterpretations in 
the History of Mathematics; Case Studies in the History and Philosophy of Math- 
ematics; and The Social Context of Modern Mathematics. Moreover, they have 
included what they call “An Opinionated Introduction,” where they fill in the 
background, first in the history of the philosophy of mathematics, then in the 
history of the history of mathematics. They give two-paragraph summaries of all 
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fourteen papers, with critiques; they discuss connections and contrasts between 
the papers; and at last, they offer their own outlook to the future. I am strongly 
tempted just to quote from the introduction or to refer the reader there. 
This volume is the outcome of a conference held at the University of Minnesota 
in May 1985. (Both Aspray and Kitcher, then at Minnesota, have since moved on 
to other pastures.) Contributors include Warren Goldfarb, “Poincare against the 
Logicists;” Michael Friedman, “Logical Truth and Analyticity in Carnap’s ‘Logi- 
cal Syntax of Language;’ ” Gregory H. Moore, ‘ ‘The Emergence of First-Order 
Logic;” Harold Edwards, “Kronecker’s Place in History;” Garrett Birkhoff and 
M.K. Bennett, “Felix Klein and His ‘Erlanger Programm;’ ” Richard Askey, 
“How Can Mathematicians and Mathematical Historians Help Each Other?” 
Lorraine J. Daston, “Fitting Numbers to the World; The Case of Probability 
Theory;” Howard Stein, “Logos, Logic, and Logistike: Some Philosophical Re- 
marks on the Nineteenth-Century Transformation of Mathematics;” Michael J. 
Crowe, “Ten Misconceptions about Mathematics and Its History;” Felix E. 
Browder, “Mathematics and the Sciences;” Philip Kitcher, “Mathematical Natu- 
ralism;” Judith V. Grabiner, “Partisans and Critics of a New Science: The Case 
of Artificial Intelligence and Some Historical Parallels;” and William Aspray, 
“The Emergence of Princeton as a World Center for Mathematical Research, 
1896-1939.” 
This collection is presented as a successor to Garrett Birkhoff s Workshop on 
the Evolution of Modern Mathematics, which took place in 1974 and was pub- 
lished in Historia Mathematics in November, 1975. 
According to the introduction, both the philosophy of mathematics and the 
history of mathematics are undergoing transitions, in which an old tradition per- 
sists even while a new, youthful trend arises to challenge the old one. The philoso- 
phy of mathematics, we are told, originated with Gottlob Frege. (There were 
those in earlier times who thought about the nature of mathematics, but that was 
“prehistory.“) After a sequence of interesting twists and turns, involving White- 
head and Russell, Hilbert, Brouwer, Wittgenstein, Godel, the Wiener Kreis, 
Quine, and others, philosophy of mathematics arrived, in the 1950’s, at “neo- 
Fregeanism. ” (We are still following Kitcher and Aspray’s introduction.) This 
neo-Fregeanism was an orthodoxy whose principal feature was the dogma that 
mathematics is about sets. More precisely, neo-Fregeanism decreed that a mathe- 
matical statement should be labelled as true only if it corresponds to the actual 
state of affairs in some set or sets. 
Guided by this historical analysis, the reader naturally seeks to classify the 
philosophical papers in this collection in two categories-neo-Fregean and anti- 
neo-Fregean. (The latter category is abbreviated to “maverick” by the editors.) 
Surprisingly, only two papers (Kitcher and Crowe) attack or even criticize neo- 
Fregeanism. The maverick papers (influenced by Lakatos’ Proofs and Refuta- 
tions) seek to connect philosophy of mathematics with history of mathematics. 
They would replace the problem, “What is the foundation of mathematics?” with 
the problem, “What is the rationale, the rational principle by which mathematics 
grows and develops?” 
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AS to the history of mathematics, according to the introduction, the old-fash- 
ioned kind is “internal,” sometimes even “hagiographic.” It tells us what great 
mathematicians have done. The new history tries to understand how mathemati- 
cal ideas evolve. It looks for influences and connections between mathematicians. 
It tries to see how mathematics has been affected by outside influences-by 
demands or ideas from physics, engineering, or other sciences, by philosophical 
or religious ideas, by the educational system, by how mathematics has been 
supported financially, by where it has stood in the social hierarchy, by the mathe- 
matical demands of war, of commerce, and of industry. 
None of the historical papers in this collection belong in the “old” category, as 
defined above; at least two deserve to be put in the “new.” 
On the basis of the introduction, one suspects that one purpose of this confer- 
ence was to advance the “maverick” trend in the philosophy of mathematics. 
(This is a goal, I may add, with which I am in wholehearted agreement.) From this 
point of view, it was natural to call it a conference on “History and Philosophy” 
and to invite historians, philosophers, and mathematicians. The results, however, 
do not seem to have had the impact in support of “maverickism” that one might 
have hoped for. The book comes off as a mixed bag of fourteen well-written, 
interesting articles, each going its own way. The introduction, with its concise 
history of Fregeanism and neo-Fregeanism and its forthright introduction of 
maverickism, is the most stimulating piece. (One can look for further elaboration 
in Kitcher’s book, The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge.) The article by 
Crowe is refreshingly controversial and thought-provoking. I found Goldfarb’s 
account of Poincare’s foundationist controversies useful and well-balanced. Spe- 
cial mention should also be given to the articles by Askey and Daston. It is a 
pleasant surprise to find an article on probability in a book on the philosophy of 
mathematics. It is even more of a surprise to find in a book on the history of 
mathematics an article by a mathematician giving advice to the historians. 
There are some sparks in the two articles relating to constructivism (Edwards 
pro, Dauben anti). The same thing was true in Birkhoff’s 1974 Workshop. Let us 
hope the constructivists stick around to stir up a little excitement now and then. 
There is an important parallel between the “maverickism” of Lakatos, Kitcher, 
Crowe, and others and the overturn in the philosophy of science some thirty years 
ago associated with the names of Popper, Kuhn, and others. In that instance, an 
abstract dogmatic doctrine (logical positivism) was displaced by an historically 
oriented “maverick” school. It is surprising that this analogy goes unmentioned in 
the present book. An example of historians neglecting history? 
The distinction between history (post-Frege) and prehistory (pre-Frege) seems 
a little shaky. Is it claimed that Kant, Descartes, and Plato have no influence on 
today’s thinking in the philosophy of mathematics? But Brouwer is described here 
as returning to Kant. (The same could be said of Hilbert-a Kantian but certainly 
no Fregean.) It is more than just a meaningless phrase that most mathematicians 
today are card-carrying Platonists. 
There is good reason to think that various versions of “maverickism” are now 
on their way to acceptance. For example, there is The Mathematical Experience 
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by P.J. Davis and R. Hersh [1981], the last two chapters of which are explicitly 
maverick philosophy. There is also Thomas Tymoczko’s valuable anthology, New 
Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics [ 19861. A symposium with this same 
title took place at the AAAS annual meeting in February 1990 and will appear in a 
forthcoming issue of Synthese. Special issues on the same theme have recently 
appeared in the Revue lnternationale de Philosophie (Brussels) and in Philo- 
sophica (Ghent). The Aspray-Kitcher volume will take an honored place on the 
growing bookshelf of maverickistic philosophy of mathematics. 
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